This paper reviews several key implications of international investment and global supply chain fragmentation for the multilateral trading system. Based on existing economic research, I identify a two-fold challenge for policy makers: first, to leverage the trade-liberalizing potential of global fragmentation at the multilateral level; and second, to counter the potential for opportunistic manipulation of behind-the-border policy instruments.
Overview
The rapid rise in global fragmentation -international ownership and the 'unbundling' of production across borders, both within and outside the boundaries of the firmintroduces new challenges for the World Trade Organization (WTO). This paper distills the key implications of frontier research in economics to draw concrete policy lessons for the multilateral trading system. When the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was first ratified in 1947, the notion of an 'American', 'French', or 'German' firm, tied to clearly delineated production, trade, and ownership patterns, was intact. For the most part, a country's economic interests coincided with its geographic boundaries, and trade between exporters in one country and importers in another generally took the form of arms-length exchanges of raw materials, commodities, and final goods traded at the border. In that environment, a 'shallow' agreement over tariffs and quotas was largely capable of mitigating any opportunistic manipulation of international activity by independent governments. The multilateral trading system has grown increasingly complex in subsequent decades. Globally fragmented supply chains, foreign investment, and cross-border portfolio holdings have introduced new and deeper economic connections between trading partners. Some of these connections make the job of the WTO easierfor instance, governments may be induced to expand market access unilaterally in response to their own constituents' offshoring investments. But in other ways, global fragmentation of production and ownership poses deep challenges for the WTO in its current form. Deeper economic integration through foreign investment or tightly woven contractual relationships between foreign suppliers and domestic buyers of customized intermediate goods could trigger opportunistic manipulation of behind the border (BTB) instruments by both governments. The current shallow integration mandate of the GATT/WTO is not equipped to counter the host of potential BTB externalities between countries. Indeed, the recent surge in regional trade agreements -many of which do carry powerful behind the border provisions -may be in part a reflection of latent demand. Moreover, to the extent that regional agreements allow some trading partners to leverage a reinforcing cycle of investment and trade liberalization, they may undermine further multilateral talks.
Building from recent research on the economics of trade agreements, this paper advocates a more nuanced understanding of governments' unilateral policy objectives in the presence of global fragmentation and international ownership. Discussion proceeds in three parts.
The next section opens with a primer on the conceptual starting point: the GATT/WTO as a "shallow" solution to a classic 'terms-of-trade driven prisoners' dilemma'. By outlining the canonical (economic) understanding of the role of the GATT/WTO in the traditional national-ownership framework, it is then relatively simple to ask how that traditional mercantilist understanding needs to be updated in light of the global fragmentation/ownership phenomenon. I identify three key features of fragmentation -foreign ownership, cross-border bargaining, and the length of global supply chains -and demonstrate how they relate to the conventional understanding 3 of market access and trade barriers.
Three broad conclusions emerge from this distillation of existing research. First, international ownership introduces a potential 'trade-investment complementarity' that can induce governments to expand market access unilaterally but preferentially.
Second, both complex arms-length supply chain relationships as well as international ownership introduce the potential for opportunistic manipulation of behind the border policy instruments by national governments. Third, longer supply chains can magnify the effects of existing trade barriers, particularly when rules of origin or value added calculations are not carefully calibrated among trading partners.
A short third section of the paper then considers the recent proliferation of regional agreements through the lens of this new framework. I first look at the extent to which the rush to preferential agreements may reflect the underlying mechanisms identified above, before considering the additional challenges that greater regional fragmentation of both production and investment may post for the multilateral trading system. The fourth and final section of the paper uses the earlier analysis to draw several concrete policy suggestions for the WTO going forward. Most ideas are not new: reduce policy uncertainty, synchronize rules of origin, protect investors from expropriation -all with an eye to encouraging trade and efficiency enhancing investment and sourcing patterns. A familiar caution is issued against regional agreements, particularly those that leave substantial variation tariffs between the signatories in dubious conformity with Article XXIV. Finally, I consider the case for integrating deeper in-4 tegration measures within the WTO umbrella -potentially including a cooperative agreement to limit FDI subsidies.
Fragmentation through the Economic Lens
This section opens by briefly outlining the canonical (economic) view of the GATT/WTO in the absence of global fragmentation -reviewing the Bagwell and Staiger (1999) argument that together the core GATT principles of MFN and reciprocity act as a simple and effective solution to the "shallow" market access conundrum known as the 'terms-of-trade driven prisoners' dilemma'. Building on recent research, the remainder of the section then extends this understanding of multilateral trade policy to an environment with globally fragmented production and international ownership.
For the purposes of economic analysis, three key characteristics of the vast global integration phenomenon prove most important: international ownership, relationshipspecific bargaining between specialized buyers and sellers, and supply chain lengthening that implies more border crossings embodied within the production of a final good. We consider each in turn following the brief 'terms-of-trade' primer below.
A Brief Primer on the WTO Terms-of-Trade Theory
Readers familiar with the economics literature of trade agreements -specifically the seminal work of Bagwell and Staiger (1999) -should feel free to skip ahead to the next section. The next few paragraphs draw heavily from their work; the interested reader is referred to their excellent book on the topic, Bagwell and Staiger (2002) 
At the most basic level, the role of any agreement is to create win-win (or Pareto improving) outcomes: all parties should gain (or at least not lose) from signing a treaty. Ergo there must be some inherent aggregate inefficiency embodied in the pre-treaty world, such that the agreement can deliver Pareto gains.
In the context of trade policy, the economics literature long identified a single source of pre-agreement inefficiency, the so-called 'terms-of-trade externality.' The idea is simple: because large countries (by definition) affect world market clearing prices, they do not bear the full burden their import tariffs, but rather shift part of the tariff cost onto foreign exporters.
1 Left to its own devices, a large country would optimally set its tariffs inefficiently high from a world-welfare point of view. Whatever a government's domestic policy preferences (which could imply a positive 'politically optimal tariff' -especially if import-competing lobby groups are politically active), it will always have an incentive to push the tariff even further above this politically optimal benchmark to exploit its market power via the terms-of-trade externality.
From here, the potential for a Pareto-improving trade agreement is immediate.
Because all large countries have the unilateral incentive to impose inefficiently high 'cost-shifting' tariffs, the treaty-less trading system is characterized by a terms-oftrade driven prisoners' dilemma: collectively and individually all countries would be 1 When a country imposes an import tariff, it causes its demand (and thus total worldwide demand) for that imported good to fall. The world price of the imported good declines as a result of the diminished demand, and so the foreign exporters' profit margins will shrink. In effect, the foreign exporters thus bear part of the burden of the large country's import tax.
6 better-off if they could commit to not increasing their tariffs beyond the politically optimal level. Bagwell and Staiger (1999) demonstrate that the twin pillars of the GATT, MNF and reciprocity, achieve precisely this end. Reciprocity allows governments the means to make cooperative agreements to reduce tariffs in lock-step, thus expanding market-access. MFN ensures that pairs of countries cannot manipulate the terms-of-trade at the expense of excluded parties. 
Trade Liberalization through International Ownership
Although conceptually distinct, global fragmentation and international ownership frequently go hand-in-hand as part of the same deep economic integration phenomenon. Cross-border ownership stakes thus may partially (or even completely) substitute for the traditionally understood role of the GATT and its successor WTO to cooperatively increase market access through (shallow) reciprocal, non-discriminatory tariff concessions. Indeed, if all countries held sufficient ownership interests in their trading partners' export sectors, those overseas investment holdings could exactly offset the beggar-they-neighbor 'terms-of-trade cost-shifting' externality that would otherwise induce governments to restrict market access.
There are, however, two important qualifications. First, import competing investment would have no such effect. In fact, economic theory suggests quite the opposite: foreign ownership in import-competing sectors -for instance because of horizontal, or 'tariff-jumping' foreign direct investment-would only sharpen governments' incentives to restrict market access through tariffs. (Roughly speaking, import competing investments abroad give a government an even greater vested interest in improving the terms-of-trade -increasing the relative price of goods that it both exports and, with horizontal investment, produces overseas directly.) Thus, it is only vertical, or offshoring types of foreign investment and ownership that create a potential 'trade-investment complementarity', whereby more investment in exportoriented operations overseas induces the investing country's government to expand market access and (thus) trade.
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A second complication derives from the potential for preferential agreements.
While preferential agreements can allow governments to harness the trade-liberalizing potential of international ownership, they also exacerbate potential exclusion of nonsignatory countries. Moreover, to the extent that international ownership is the result of foreign direct investment, preferential agreements induce both trade and investment diversion at the expense of excluded countries. Section 3 takes up these and related issues in greater depth.
Importantly, the potential trade-liberalizing influence of foreign ownership finds empirical support in practice. A recent study (Blanchard and Matschke (2014) ) finds strong evidence of a causal link between offshoring activity by U.S. foreign affiliates and the structure of U.S. trade preferences. The effect is big, too -the baseline estimation results indicate that a 10 percent increase in affiliate sales to the U.S.
leads to roughly a 4 percentage point increase in the rate of duty free access under preferential trade programs -or a 20 percent expansion of the rate of preferential 5 Baldwin (2010) points out an interesting caveat in the spirit of Kojima (1975) : to the extent that inward FDI in a downstream import-competing industry increases its political influence, that FDI could induce tariff reductions on upstream industries (though this would require the political impact of the downstream industry's growth to outweigh the political cost of being 'foreign').
market access relative to the mean. The trade-investment complementarity appears to be more than an academic possibility; it demonstrates measurable practical relevance today.
Expropriation, Bargaining, and BTB Policy Changes
A second key feature of global fragmentation lies in expanded opportunities for manipulation of behind the border (BTB) policy instruments by opportunistic governments. To the extent that WTO's mandate extends to any government action that would "produce an adverse effect on the balance of commercial activity," as posited by Hudec (1990) (pg 24), the growing scope for BTB policy abuse warrants explicit attention in the evolving vision of the multilateral trading system. permit requirements could be structured in such a way to shift profits from foreign investors to the host government or domestic firms or workers.
Crucially, lengthening global supply chains can introduce opportunistic BTB policy changes even absent international ownership. When buyers and sellers trade in highly specialized intermediate inputs -the kind of transactions that are increasingly common as production becomes more fragmented -transaction prices are often determined by bilateral bargaining, rather than traditionally understood market cleaning conditions. As Antras and Staiger (2012a) demonstrate, the bargaining process can be opportunistically manipulated by governments of both countries through both trade policy and behind-the-border policy changes. (The BTB channel is articulated explicitly in Antras and Staiger (2012b) .) Cooperative agreements over traditional market access mechanisms thus may prove insufficient to reach globally efficient outcomes.
Unfortunately, it is far easier to recognize the potential for BTB policy manipulation than it is to mitigate it in practice. While TRIMs protections are almost certainly insufficient, as they apply only to trade related investment protections, much broader investment protections -for example, like the provisions in the NAFTA's
Chapter 11 -present their own problems. The key question going forward is which design features at the multilateral level are necessary for mitigating opportunistic BTB policies, and which, if any, of those ideal BTB policy guidelines can be operationalized in practice.
Staiger and Sykes (2011), and Antras and Staiger (2012b) , but these questions remain an important topic for future research. Second, preferential agreements may undercut multilateral liberalization. To the extent that fragmentation or foreign investment spurs greater policy liberalization through preferential agreements, and those agreements further deepen economic ties as supply chains spread across signatories' borders, the cycle of improved market access and increased fragmentation may continue. At the same time, however, it stands to fear that the same mechanism can lead to substantial trade and investment diversion; just as some trading partners experience ever-greater economic integration through a trade-investment complementarity, other countries may be left out entirely.
Supply

Applying Research to Practice
I conclude by outlining a handful of policy implications that follow directly from the economic arguments articulated above. The first three are clear, actionable points, while the last three identify broader and more complex issues to be taken up in subsequent work. The key challenge is twofold: first, to harness the trade-liberalizing potential of international investment without exacerbating regional/preferential exclusivity; and second, to counter potential opportunistic BTB policy manipulation directly.
The first two policy suggestions are relatively straightforward means by which to encourage deeper economic ties through foreign investment and supply chain integration, which in turn may induce governments to reduce tariffs and non-tariff barriers unilaterally:
1. Simplify and synchronize rules of origin to reduce the implicit penalties faced by long supply chains and fragmented production.
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2. Reduce policy uncertainty; fragmentation typically involves sunk investments that are more readily undertaken in a stable policy environment. In the context of current rules, uncertainty is perhaps best mitigated by enforcing limited and judicious use of temporary trade measures (anti-dumping, CVDs, and safeguards) will serve to reduce uncertainty faced by exporters and, thus, potential investors in export sectors.
11 See, among others, Baldwin (2006) for a careful discussion of diagonal vs. full cumulation rules.
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The next point is more a policy caution than suggestion. It recognizes the potential for fragmentation to increase governments' demand for sharper trade policy instruments: to the extent that narrowly defined policy instruments can be used with surgical precision to benefit only key constituent beneficiaries (like a particular multinational firm's foreign affiliates in a particular market), any benefit of tradeinvestment complementarity will accrue to just a handful of beneficiaries. Perhaps the most important means to dissuade manipulation of targeted temporary remedies is to maintain a strong, fast, fair, and effective dispute settlement process.
3. Limit the ability of antidumping and countervailing duties to discriminate (de facto or de jure) at the country and firm level. When trade protections can be defined at the firm (as in the case of AD duties) or very-narrow (10+ digit HS) product-country level, they may be used to impose differential tariff treatment against exports by preferred (foreign affiliate) vs. arms-length foreign suppliers.
The last three points identify two key areas on which the WTO should consider in response to the global fragmentation of production and ownership. The first simply reiterates the long-held and central concern over regional or preferential trade agreements, noting that fragmentation may increase the urgency of the problem. The second advocates direct consideration of deeper integration measures at the multilateral level: unless deeper integration measures return to the multilateral negotiating table, multinational firms -a key constituency in trade policy for many countriescan be expected to continue to press for additional regional agreements rather than multilateral negotiations. The third point echoes Blanchard (2013) 6. Reconsider multilateral investment disciplines. There is growing concern that potential FDI-host countries are engaged in a 'race-to-the-bottom' in investment subsidies, and that this race may be intensified by the potential for Article XXIV-style trade deals. If true, there is a strong efficiency argument in favor of a cooperative agreement to limit implicit and explicit subsidies to foreign investors.
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These last points are both the most contentious and the most difficult to implement in practice. It is clear that deep integration measures can protect foreign firms, investors, and cross-border relationships from BTB policy manipulation, and thus have the potential, if done right, to enrich the economic ties between signatory countries. Lawrence (2011) recently proposed a two tiered system within the WTO, one that would supplement the core GATT obligations with optional, add-on plurilateral deep-integration agreements into which countries could opt-in or out. The key, notes
Lawrence, is to offer a WTO-based framework that is more attractive than regional agreements. The move away from RTAs cannot be forced -but perhaps it can be coerced by creating a better alternative.
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